Greenland Is No Accident: The EU’s Longstanding Mistakes

The current dispute over Greenland appears at first glance to be yet another example of Donald Trump’s provocative rhetoric. In reality, however, it exposes deeper structural weaknesses in European foreign and security policy. The debate over possible U.S. claims, military options, and European red lines is less a sudden escalation than the result of years of strategic failures by the European Union. The Greenland case shows how deeply Europe is trapped between normative aspirations and the realities of power politics—and how this gap is now being exploited by other actors. The following analysis outlines which mistakes the EU has made in recent years, which false assumptions it continues to uphold today, and which political, security, and geopolitical consequences are likely to follow.

I. EU mistakes in past years that contributed to the current situation

1. Strategic self-complacency after the Cold War

For decades, the EU settled into the assumption that:

territorial revisions among allies were “unthinkable,”
the United States would remain a benevolent security guarantor indefinitely,
economic interdependence would defuse geopolitical conflict.

Error:  The EU took the return of power politics—also by partners—seriously far too late. Trump’s first Greenland initiative (2019) was ridiculed rather than processed strategically.

Consequence:  As Trump now escalates, Europe appears reactive rather than prepared.

2. Neglect of the Arctic as a geopolitical space

Although:

climate change is opening up the Arctic strategically,
Russia and China are investing heavily,
Greenland is central to security and raw-materials policy,

the EU has:

failed to develop a coherent Arctic security strategy,
treated Greenland primarily as an environmental and development issue,
delegated security questions to NATO and the U.S.

Error: The EU was politically present but absent in terms of power politics.

Consequence:  A vacuum that the U.S. now seeks to fill—“necessarily,” from its perspective.

3. An unclear relationship with Greenland itself

Greenland is:

politically autonomous,
economically dependent (primarily on Denmark),
limited in its capacity to act in foreign and security policy.

The EU failed to:

systematically integrate Greenland as an independent political actor,
offer long-term industrial, raw-materials, and security cooperation,
present alternatives to U.S. dominance.

Error:  The EU talked about Greenland—but too rarely with Greenland.

Consequence:  Washington can credibly argue that Europe made no serious offers.

4. Persistent security dependence on the United States

Despite all the Sunday speeches:

the EU remained militarily fragmented,
it did not credibly build up its deterrence capabilities,
it reflexively shifted hard security issues to NATO (and thus effectively to the U.S.).

Error:  Europe wanted geopolitical sovereignty without paying the price.

Consequence:  The U.S. feels entitled to treat European security spaces as its own sphere of interest.

II. What mistakes is the EU making today?

1. Moral clarity instead of strategic depth

The EU is currently responding primarily with:

legally correct but predictable statements,
emphasis on sovereignty and international law,
demonstrative solidarity with Denmark.

Error: Normatively correct—but strategically incomplete.

What is missing:

a concrete European counteroffer,
a plan for the long-term security of Greenland,
credible power projection.

Consequence:  The EU looks like a commentator, not an actor.

2. Public escalation instead of discreet power politics

By:

drawing red lines publicly,
openly condemning U.S. threats,
moralizing the conflict in the media,

the EU does not reduce Trump’s loss of face—it increases it.

Error:  Underestimating Trump’s logic: outward escalation substitutes for domestic weakness.

Consequence:  The risk grows that Trump will escalate rhetorically—or symbolically—further to demonstrate strength.

3. Lack of differentiation within the United States

The EU is currently speaking “to the United States,”

instead of clearly distinguishing between the White House, the State Department, Congress, and the military.

Yet:

Rubio and the Pentagon are significantly more restrained,
parts of the Republican Party clearly oppose a military course.

Error:  Europe treats the U.S. as a monolithic actor—which it is not.

Consequence:  Europe unintentionally strengthens hardliners instead of engaging moderating forces.

4. No independent security initiative for Greenland

So far there is:

no EU mission,
no joint Arctic security architecture,
no European security guarantee beyond abstract solidarity.

Error:  The EU says what must not happen—but not what it itself is prepared to do.

Consequence:  The U.S. can argue that it must “act out of necessity” because Europe does not.

III. Likely consequences of these mistakes

Short term (months)

Rising tensions in transatlantic relations.
Further verbal escalations from Washington.
Domestic political pressure on Denmark and Greenland.

Medium term (1–3 years)

Loss of trust in the EU as a security actor.
Greater U.S. unilateralism in other European peripheral regions.
Growing doubts among smaller states as to whether EU solidarity is more than rhetoric.

Long term

A precedent: interests over alliance solidarity.
Weakening of NATO cohesion.
Accelerated fragmentation of the Western order.

IV. Sharpened conclusion

The EU is suffering here not primarily from a Trump problem, but from a structural problem of its own:  it wants to defend a rules-based order without being willing to organize power itself.

Greenland is less the objective than the test case of whether Europe has become geopolitically mature.